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Tamm: Comment--Class Action Fairness Act

THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT AND COLORABLE
REASONS FOR SEPARATE CLASS ACTIONS
Kevin Tamm*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), codified at section 1332(d)
of the U.S. Code, grants the federal courts jurisdiction over civil class
action suits with minimal diversity, at least one hundred plaintiffs, and
amount in controversy more than $5 million.1 However, the statute is
silent in situations where there is minimal diversity, at least one hundred
plaintiffs, and the amount in controversy is $4,999,999.2 Furthermore,
the statute provides no guidance when similar plaintiff classes file
multiple irremovable suits against a single defendant.3 Nevertheless, the
lack of statutory guidance in § 1332 did not stop the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc. from
aggregating five similar class action lawsuits in order to satisfy CAFA’s
removal requirements.4
In each of the individual class actions preceding Freeman, the
plaintiffs claimed close to $4.9 million, and because the plaintiffs “put
forth no colorable reason for breaking up the lawsuits,” the Sixth
Circuit aggregated the claims.5 Other circuit courts have not followed
the “colorable reason test” created in Freeman and have distinguished
the case on factual differences, statutory interpretation, and the
relevance of Congressional intent.6 The decision in Freeman achieves
the result of judicial efficiency,7 but contradicts the axiom that the
plaintiff is the “master of his complaint.”8
Part II of this Comment addresses how the Sixth Circuit has used the
“colorable basis test” to aggregate class action suits where plaintiffs
* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011). Minimal diversity for CAFA is satisfied when “any member of
a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
2. See § 1332(d).
3. See id.
4. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2008).
5. Id. (emphasis added). The majority and dissent also use the phrase “colorable basis.” Id. at
409, 411.
6. See, e.g., Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011) (separating
suits allowed when plaintiffs filed claims to match defendant’s prior law suits); Barria v. Dole Food Co.,
No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009)
(separating suits allowed when each suit has different plaintiffs).
7. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 408.
8. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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have split their claims to avoid federal jurisdiction. Afterward, this
Comment analyzes cases from other circuits to explain why other
appellate courts have not accepted the colorable basis test. Part III
discusses the inherent weaknesses of the colorable basis test, along with
possible changes to the language of CAFA that would remedy the
problems Freeman attempted to address. Part IV concludes that that
Congress must amend § 1332(d) to better guide judges in complex class
removal situations.
II. BACKGROUND
Since Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, courts
have cited a litany of congressional records to explain the application of
the law.9 The general intent of CAFA was to provide defendants an
easier road into federal court to prevent bias in plaintiff-friendly state
courts.10 The relevant Senate Report explains that CAFA “mak[es] it
harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying to defeat
diversity jurisdiction” and “creat[es] efficiencies . . . by allowing
overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases to be consolidated . . . .”11
Additionally, CAFA allows cases of “national importance” to be
removed more easily to the federal courts.12 The various purposes of
CAFA, combined with a lack of explicit statutory guidance, have led to
a divergent jurisprudence concerning aggregation in class action suits,
which will be discussed herein.13
A. The Colorable Basis Test as a More Searching Inquiry
The Sixth Circuit was the first, and remains the only, circuit court to
support the colorable basis test for aggregating class action claims.14 In
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc., Tennessee landowners
sued a North Carolina paper mill for polluting a local river.15 The
landowners divided their claims into five separate lawsuits based on
9. See, e.g., id. at 408; Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72467, at *3–4, *7–11 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008).
10. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407.
11. Id. at 408.
12. See id.
13. Compare id. at 408–09, with Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir.
2011) (Freeman majority focusing on congressional intent to remove the class actions and Marple
majority focusing on the statutory language of CAFA to not aggregate separate suits).
14. This is derived by using the “Shepardize” function on LEXIS. The case has been followed 3
times, once on other grounds, and distinguished 39 times as of Dec. 4, 2011. Available at
http://www.lexis.com.
15. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 406. There were 300 plaintiffs located downriver of the North
Carolina plant. Id.
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sequential time periods related to the total span of pollution.16 Each suit
had the same plaintiffs and claims, and the damages in each case totaled
near $4.9 million.17 The defendant successfully removed the cases to
federal court; however, the plaintiffs later succeeded on their motion to
remand to state court.18 The defendant corporation then appealed to the
Sixth Circuit to reverse the district court judgment; the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded the cases to the federal district court.19
The Sixth Circuit held that the remand to state court was improper
because the “[p]laintiffs put forth no colorable reason for breaking up
the lawsuits . . . other than to avoid federal jurisdiction.”20 The court
found no “colorable reason” to divide the suits by time periods, partly
because the plaintiffs’ counsel admitted he structured the case to avoid
federal jurisdiction.21 Furthermore, the court noted that the structuring
would frustrate the “‘Congressional intent and purpose of the CAFA.’”22
The court limited its holding to situations “where there is no colorable
basis for dividing up the [class actions] into separate time periods, other
than to frustrate CAFA.”23
The Freeman court derived its reasoning from an earlier district court
opinion in the Sixth Circuit. In Proffitt v. Abbott Laboratories, the
plaintiffs filed eleven class action lawsuits with the same plaintiffs and
defendant.24 The plaintiffs argued that being the master of the
complaint entitled them to disclaim damages over $4,999,000 and
separate the suits; however, the court stated, “It is apparent . . . that the
time divisions are a deliberate attempt to circumvent the CAFA . . . .”25
The court noted that the plaintiffs might have arranged the suits in other
ways, such as two-year divisions, because the time divisions had no
purpose other than avoiding federal jurisdiction.26 Citing the Senate
Judiciary Committee and congressional findings, the court concluded,
“When Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332, it intended to broaden
federal court jurisdiction.”27
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 407.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 407.
22. Id. at 408 (citing Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467,
at *7–12 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008)).
23. Id. at 409.
24. Proffitt, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *1–2. The suits concerned the same drug, TriCor, and
only one antitrust conspiracy was claimed. Id. at *2.
25. Id. at *4, *6.
26. Id. at *6.
27. Id. at *7. The court cited the Senate Judiciary Committee, which stated, “Overall, new
section 1332(d) is intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

316

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

Shortly after the holdings in Proffitt and Freeman, the colorable basis
test was applied again in the Sixth Circuit.28 In Hubbard v. Electronic
Arts, Inc., current and former college student athletes filed three similar
class action suits.29 The first suit, Hubbard I, contained antitrust-related
claims, and the second, Hubbard II, had multiple state law claims.30
The plaintiffs’ counsel also filed a third class action suit, Nuckles, on
behalf of former student-athletes.31 Nuckles was nearly identical to
Hubbard II, which counsel filed on behalf of current student athletes.32
The plaintiffs accused Electronic Arts (EA) of monopolizing NCAA
football video games, raising game prices artificially by eliminating
competition, and abusing students by not paying for their likenesses.33
EA removed the cases using CAFA’s removal provision, and the
district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand.34 The plaintiffs in
each of the three suits capped their damages at $4,999,999.00,35 and the
court found that counsel filed the complaints separately to avoid federal
jurisdiction.36 The court agreed that plaintiffs “may defeat removal to
federal court by suing for less than the jurisdictional amount[,]” and that
“[i]t is generally agreed in this circuit, that the amount in controversy
should be determined from the perspective of the plaintiff . . . .”37 On
the other hand, the court emphasized that damage disclaimers do not
preclude a defendant from removing a case if the defendant can show it
is “more likely than not” that the minimum amount in controversy will
be met.38
Regarding the Hubbard II and Nuckles suits, the district court
attempted to reconcile the Freeman colorable basis test with an earlier
Sixth Circuit case.39 Smith v. Nationwide Property & Casualty
Insurance Co. held that where the plaintiff had claimed $4,999,999.00 in

provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard
in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.” Id. at *8.
28. See Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
29. Id. at *2–4.
30. Id. The plaintiffs included violations of the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee
Protection of Personal Rights Act of 1984, the Tennessee common law, and charges of unjust
enrichment. Id.
31. Id. at *5.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *3–4.
34. Id. at *1–2.
35. Id. at *2, *6, *11–12.
36. Id. at *5.
37. Id. at *7 (internal quotes omitted).
38. Id. at *8 (internal quotes omitted). The burden of proof of damages is discussed further infra
at Part III(B).
39. See id. at *12–15.
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breach of contract damages, the suit could be remanded because the
defendant failed to show that the damages would “more likely than not”
exceed $5 million.40
The court experienced difficulty reconciling the deferential “plaintiff
is master of his complaint” logic from Smith with the “colorable reason”
logic from Freeman.41 The court noted the Freeman test was not
“clearly define[d]” and did not “give instructions on its application.”42
Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to distinguish Freeman by explaining that
the plaintiffs and defendants in the Hubbard II and Nuckles suits were
different; however, the court found this was not a “legitimate
purpose.”43 Finally, the court aggregated the claims in Hubbard II and
Nuckles, having not found a colorable reason for the structuring.44
B. Distinguishing Freeman’s Colorable Reason Test From the “Plaintiff
as the Master of the Complaint”
Other circuit courts have not followed the colorable reason test45 and
typically distinguish Freeman on minor factual differences or
completely avoid it.46 An example is the Eighth Circuit case Marple v.
T-Mobile Central LLC, where T-Mobile, prior to the suit, had sued
Missouri municipalities for refund of tax payments.47 The plaintiff,
Marple, then sued T-Mobile because she believed the phone company
had passed the cost of the tax unfairly onto consumers.48 Marple
brought ten separate but similar class action lawsuits to claim any
money T-Mobile might recover in its suits.49 T-Mobile tried to remove
the cases, but Marple won the motion to remand, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.50
The appellate court discussed the statutory language of CAFA and
noted the lack of explicit guidance for aggregation between multiple
40. Id. Punitive damages were not available in the case making it unlikely the damages would
meet the amount in controversy. Id. See also Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401,
403 (6th Cir. 2007).
41. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *21–22.
42. Id. at *21.
43. Id. at *24. In other circuits, this has in fact been found to be a legitimate purpose for
separating claims. See, e.g., Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
44. See Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24.
45. See supra Part II(A), n.14.
46. See Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2011).
47. Id. The tax payments had been made under protest, and T-Mobile divided the claims into 10
suits based on 10 specific time periods when taxes were paid. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1110–11.
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class action suits.51 The court found “the absence of provisions [in
CAFA] for aggregating between class actions . . . suggests that the use
of the singular [class action] is significant.”52 Here, the court
distinguished Freeman and found that Marple divided her suits in order
to mirror the earlier T-Mobile suits, not to evade federal jurisdiction.53
In distinguishing Freeman, the reasoning from Marple closely follows
that of Freeman’s dissent.54
The dissent in Freeman agreed with the majority opinion that a
pivotal reason behind CAFA was to prevent plaintiffs from “keeping
[class action] cases of national importance out of federal court.”55
However, the dissent believed the pollution cases were not of such
importance that a new claim aggregation rule should be created.56
Furthermore, the dissent found “no authority” for the creation of a
“colorable basis” requirement and argued the plaintiffs could divide
their suits based on time because each time the defendant discharged
pollutants, a new cause of action may arise.57 Additional cases also
distinguish the result reached in Freeman.
In Barria v. Dole Food Co., one of a group of many similar class
action cases, 2,485 banana plantation workers brought nine causes of
action against Dole and other companies.58 The plaintiffs filed multiple
suits with less than one hundred plaintiffs each, and the damages never
exceeded $5 million.59 The defendants argued that the California
Superior Court, where the plaintiffs filed, had a minimum jurisdiction
limit of $25,000, and therefore the total claims would logically exceed
$62 million.60 The defendant also wanted to question the plaintiffs as to
whether the damages they sought were truly under $75,000 per
plaintiff.61
51. Id. at 1110.
52. Id. (emphasis added). The court is referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 using the term “class
action” when describing claim aggregation within one suit in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) and not “class
actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011).
53. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111. The original suits by T-Mobile against the municipalities were
filed according to separate time spans, like the suits in Freeman. Id. at 1110.
54. Compare id. at 1110–11, with Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 410–
11 (6th Cir. 2008).
55. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 410 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (internal quotes omitted).
56. Id. at 410–11 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
58. Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *3–
4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). The planters alleged that Dole caused harm by producing and using a toxic
chemical in the growing of bananas. Id. at *5.
59. Id. at *4, *7.
60. Id. at *8–9. Multiplying 2,485 plaintiffs by $25,000 equals $62,125,000.
61. Id. at *9. In Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006), plaintiffs had
lied about the amount they hoped to recover and admitted after remand to state court that they were in
fact seeking more than the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy. See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist.
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Ultimately, the court distinguished Freeman by explaining that the
different banana planters in each case were “distinct plaintiffs,” and it
upheld the “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction in the
Ninth Circuit.62 The court stated, “defendants have not shown that it is
‘more likely than not’ that any plaintiff’s claim satisfies the $75,000
jurisdictional requirement [or the $5 million aggregate in an individual
class suit].”63 The justices also refused to speculate as to whether any
plaintiffs were lying and would not aggregate their claims.64
Freeman and the many cases that refuse to adopt its logic raise a
further issue as to what defendants and plaintiffs must show in order to
achieve or avoid removal in the federal circuit courts.
C. Judicial Standard for Proof of Damages
In addition to the amount in controversy, issues surrounding the
standard of proof of damages also affect CAFA removal. The court in
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products avoided the issue by first
aggregating the claims of the suits, and then stating, “[b]ecause
plaintiffs’ suits in the aggregate seek up to $24.5 million, we need not
decide the proper standard of proof under CAFA when a plaintiff limits
his damages to less than the jurisdictional amount . . . .”65 The claim
aggregation allowed the court to presume that the damages exceeded the
required amount in controversy unless proven otherwise to a “legal
certainty.”66
The court in Hubbard v. Electronic Arts, Inc. addressed the issue
ignored by the Freeman court and explained that, typically, deference
should be given to the plaintiffs in determining damages in a suit.67
However, the court explained that the burden on the defendant to prove
damages is only the “more likely than not” standard, which is less rigid
than the “legal certainty” standard.68 With regard to aggregating
Hubbard II and Nuckles, the court explained three situations: (1) where
a plaintiff pleads an amount over the amount in controversy, the amount
LEXIS 27926, at *11–12, n.2.
62. Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *9–14. Burden of proof of damages will be
discussed further in Part III(B), infra.
63. Id. at *11–12, n.2.
64. See id. at *11–12, n.1–2.
65. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008). The defendant
was not required to show each suit would likely exceed $5 million because in the court’s view there was
only one suit for up to $24.5 million. Id.
66. Id. This is a high burden of proof compared to the preponderance or more likely than not
standards.
67. Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859, at *7–8 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
68. Id. at *8.
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is presumed correct and the defendant must prove to a legal certainty it
is not correct; (2) where a plaintiff pleads an unspecified amount, the
defendant must show with a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount is exceeded for removal; and (3) where plaintiff pleads under
the amount in controversy, the defendant must show it is more likely
than not the amount in controversy is exceeded.69 In aggregating
Hubbard II and Nuckles, the court once again treated the claims as if the
plaintiff had filed only one suit, and found that remand was not
appropriate under the “legal certainty” test.70
The Eighth Circuit in Marple did not address the standard of proof,
because the defendant argued only that the claims should be
aggregated71 and offered no evidence to prove that each suit would
exceed $5 million.72 Thus, when the court did not aggregate the claims,
removal was inappropriate.73
The Ninth Circuit in Barria v. Dole Food Co. offered a detailed
discussion of the legal standard concerning the defendant’s burden for
removing the cases concerning the banana pickers.74 The court never
referred to a legal certainty test; however, it found that the defendants
never overcame the “strong presumption” against removal to federal
court.75 The court did not find sufficient “underlying facts” to support
the plaintiff’s argument that the individual claims would exceed
$75,000, nor that the claims in each suit would exceed $5 million.76 The
defendants presented evidence from prior class actions to show actual
damages awarded far exceeded disclaimed damages, but this was not
sufficient for the court.77
The inconsistent application of the colorable basis test, and varying
alternative legal standards, create uncertainty for plaintiffs and
defendants. In addition, this line of cases could result in the same
problems that existed before the passage of CAFA, including forum
shopping and gaming the class action system to stay in plaintiff-friendly
state courts. The following parts address the uncertainty these decisions
69. Id. at *18–21.
70. Id. at *24–25. In Freeman and Hubbard, then, a high burden of remand fell on the plaintiffs
where the amounts in controversy were assumed to be over $5 million and the plaintiffs presumably
needed to prove damages under $5 million to a “legal certainty.”
71. Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2011); See also Marple v.
T-Mobile Cent., LLC, No. 10-CV-00954-NKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan 27,
2011).
72. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111.
73. See id. The amount in controversy for each suit was less than $5 million. See id.
74. Barria v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926,
at *7–12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *11–12, n.2.
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have created, and suggest ways to prevent future problems that
deficiencies in CAFA’s language might cause.
III. DISCUSSION
Recent class action removal jurisprudence has created a confusing
trail for plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to
determine when legitimate reasons exist for splitting a suit to avoid
removal, especially when splitting damages by time periods is not
legitimate, but splitting damages according to defendants’ earlier suits is
legitimate.78 Furthermore, judges make removal decisions with little
statutory guidance from Congress other than the minimum amount in
controversy, minimal diversity, and 100 plaintiffs requirements in
§ 1332(d). While it is the judiciary’s role to say “what the law is,” it is
not the job of the judiciary to legislate where Congress has failed to
implement statutory protections.79 Furthermore, class action removal
law should not become some tertium quid composed of loose judicial
interpretations of CAFA and varying state law burdens of proof. By
adding greater detail to § 1332(d), Congress could create more certainty
and consistency in complex class removal situations.
A. Current Problems and Furthering the Intent of CAFA
The overriding reasons that Congress adopted CAFA were to make
removal easier for defendants and to prevent plaintiffs from forum
shopping.80 The Sixth Circuit in Freeman reinforced this point by citing
congressional notes concerning CAFA, Senate Reports, and House
Reports.81 These sources supported the idea that in the past, lawyers
had “gamed” the class action system and thus CAFA was needed to

78. Compare Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008), with
Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111.
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
80. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08. “CAFA was necessary because the previous law
enable[d] lawyers to game the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and approving settlements without
regard to class member interests.” Id. at 408 (internal quotes omitted).
The Senate Judiciary Committee unambiguously signaled where it believed the burden
should lie. The committee report said overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand
substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provisions should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal
court if properly removed by any defendant.
Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23,
2008) (internal quotes omitted).
81. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08.
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prevent further frivolous suits.82 By choosing to aggregate suits when
there was no colorable basis for separating them, the Freeman court
furthered the intent of many in Congress at the time of the passage of
CAFA.83 However, the court also strayed from the plain reading of the
law and added qualifiers to § 1332(d) that are not present in the original
text of the statute.84
First, because CAFA has no colorable reason requirement for
separating claims, the courts in Freeman, Proffitt, and Hubbard
overstepped their bounds in imposing a heightened pleading standard on
the plaintiffs.85 In Freeman, the court found persuasive plaintiff
counsel’s admission that avoiding CAFA was the only reason for
dividing the suits, but the court did not explain why it relied on this
comment.86 CAFA does not delve into the intent of plaintiffs or their
counsel.87 Further, the court found CAFA’s purpose “obvious,” but the
majority cited only congressional history favorable to its position.88
Certainly, different legislators had varying reasons for supporting
CAFA, and courts should not read in a legal standard, such as here, by
requiring a “colorable reason,” where the statutory language is clear.89
Justice Daughtrey, the dissenting judge in Freeman, skeptically
viewed the majority’s approach to furthering congressional intent by
constructing a rule to stop plaintiffs from keeping “cases of national
importance out of the Federal court.”90 The dissent noted that the
pollution cases should be viewed as “matter[s] of local concern” because
the class was composed of property owners from Cocke County,
Tennessee.91 Further, Judge Daughtrey argued that during the period of
the river pollution, new causes of action may arise each time pollutants
enter the water, thus making the divisions not arbitrary.92 An
82. Id.
83. Id. at 408–09.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011). There is no “colorable reason” requirement for plaintiffs to
divide their suits.
85. See id. Requiring a colorable reason to bring separate law suits in state court is comparable
to the risk faced by plaintiffs under the heighted plausibility pleading standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. Here, though, there is no similar requirement for any reason to
split class claims enunciated by Congress or the Supreme Court. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–81 (2009).
86. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
88. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08.
89. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (“Statutory construction
must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of
that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”) (internal quotes omitted).
90. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 410 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 408).
91. Id. The dissent saw a weak interstate connection because the paper mill accused of polluting
the river was located in nearby North Carolina and was incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 410–11.
92. Id. at 411.
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unresolved issue, then, is what showing the majority would require
without the plaintiffs’ counsel having admitted the suits were structured
to avoid federal jurisdiction for the suits to proceed to federal court.93
The dissent, in making its decision, continued to argue that the
majority ignored the historical axiom that “the plaintiff is the ‘master of
his complaint’”.94 The majority stated that even though there were 300
plaintiffs in each suit, by limiting individual damages at $74,000 and
overall damages at $4.9 million, the plaintiffs could have remained in
state court because “[p]resumably that overall limit for each time period
is binding on the plaintiffs . . . .”95 In response, Judge Daughtrey aptly
noted the majority arbitrarily would allow plaintiffs to cap damages in
one suit to avoid federal jurisdiction, but not in multiple suits.96 The
dissent concluded by stating there is “no authority to support the
majority’s adoption of a ‘colorable basis’ requirement . . . .”97
The Freeman dissent had the stronger argument, because without
congressional guidance or state law, the majority lacks authority to go
beyond the clear language of § 1332(d) and impose a “colorable reason”
requirement on plaintiffs. Furthermore, the majority did not lay out
factors to guide lower courts in determining what qualifies as a
“colorable reason” under this heightened standard. The majority
followed the reasoning of Proffitt v. Abbott Labs.,98 which aggregated
claims in eleven lawsuits divided into eleven one-year periods because
the structuring was “at odds ‘with the Congressional intent and purpose
of CAFA.’”99 However, in Proffitt the eleven complaints each pointed
to one conspiracy that took place throughout the eleven years.100 In
contrast, the defendant in Freeman never showed that the pollution
occurred in the same manner over all five of the six-month periods.101
Uncertainty arises when courts rely on congressional intent instead of
statutory language.102 The Proffitt court cited a litany of documents to
show Congress’s intent including the Senate Judiciary Committee
Reports and congressional findings prior to enactment of CAFA.103 The

93. The decision relying in part on this fact makes it seem quite ad hoc.
94. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 411 (6th Cir. 2008) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 411 (quoting majority opinion at 409).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008).
99. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 408 (6th Cir. 2008).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
102. Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (“[T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and
ill advised in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face . . . .”)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
103. Proffitt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3–4, *7–11.
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court also relied on other cases citing congressional history in order to
avoid copycat and duplicative law suits in different state courts.104 The
court concluded, quite properly, that “[t]he intent of Congress was clear
that the new § 1332(d) would substantially broaden federal court
jurisdiction over class actions.”105 However, § 1332(d) carries out that
goal when applied as it reads, and the courts should not amplify the
intent of Congress sua sponte.
Moreover, in Proffitt the defendant offered no proof to show the
plaintiffs divided their suits to prevent CAFA removal; it was merely
“apparent to the court.”106 Thus, unresolved issues remain such as
whether direct or circumstantial evidence is required to show that there
is no colorable reason for division of claims, and whether class actions
separated by periods of time must be tied to physical events. If the
colorable basis test is not to become merely a judicial carte blanche to
impose congressional intent, then further statutory guidance is surely
needed.
In applying the colorable basis test, the Hubbard court stated, “The
[Freeman] court did not clearly define the test or give instructions on its
application.”107 The confused court tried to reconcile the colorable
reason test from Freeman108 with the earlier case of Smith v. Nationwide
Property & Casualty Insurance Co.109 In Smith, the defendant failed to
carry its burden and could not show that it was “more likely than not”
that the plaintiffs’ damages would exceed the claimed $4,999,999.00.110
The Hubbard court noted from Smith that the plaintiff is the “master of
his complaint and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction.”111 After
reviewing Smith, the court ultimately had difficulty reconciling it with
Freeman, where the court held that “identical” lawsuits must be
aggregated when there is no colorable reason for “splintering” them.112
The court noted that the plaintiffs were different in the two suits—
current student athletes and former student athletes—and that the
plaintiffs sued different defendants.113 Yet, the court still found that the
104. See id. at *9–11.
105. Id. at *12.
106. Id. at *6.
107. Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859, at *21 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
108. See id. at *12–23.
109. 505 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2007).
110. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *13–14.
111. Id. at *13. The court also quotes Smith: “A disclaimer in a complaint regarding the amount
of recoverable damages does not preclude a defendant from removing the matter to federal court upon a
demonstration that damages are ‘more likely than not’ to ‘meet the amount in controversy
requirement[.]” Id. at *13–14.
112. See id. at *22–23.
113. Id. at *23.
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plaintiffs splintered the suits for no colorable reason other than to avoid
federal jurisdiction.114 The court ruled, “It seems that the only way to
reconcile Smith and Freeman is that the plaintiff . . . is not the so-called
master of his complaint if he specifically drafts it to avoid CAFA by
‘splintering’ identical lawsuits by time.”115 The court continued,
“However, [the plaintiff] is the master of his complaint and can
specifically plead to avoid federal jurisdiction by using disclaimers to
limit the amount in controversy any other time.”116
The result that flows from Hubbard is an absurd extension of CAFA
through judicial legislation. The court aggregated the $4,999,999 claims
from Hubbard II and Nuckles, where the plaintiffs had sued on behalf of
current and former college athletes respectively.117 CAFA provides in
§ 1332(d)(6), “In any class action, the claims of the individual class
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .”118 Thus,
Congress spoke specifically to aggregating plaintiffs’ claims within
individual suits, and not to claim aggregation between suits, even if the
suits are “identical” or “splintered for no colorable reason.”
From Hubbard, it becomes clear that with a malleable test like the
“colorable reason” test, courts will take advantage and expand the test
when it suits their goals. Freeman’s holding was limited “to the
situation where there is no colorable basis for dividing up the sought-for
retrospective relief into separate time periods, other than to frustrate
CAFA.”119 However, in Hubbard, the suits were not merely divided by
time periods, but were also differentiated by plaintiffs and defendants
with unique characteristics.120 Yet, the court still found a way to expand
the holding of Freeman by finding that current and former student
athletes represented “time periods.”121 This interpretation is a strained
reading of Freeman and Proffitt, and more importantly takes an
important step toward limiting the “colorable reasons” that exist for
splitting class suits in the Sixth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit in Marple v. T-Mobile Central, LLC specifically
noted “the absence of provisions for aggregating between class actions
here suggests that the use of the singular is significant.”122 Furthermore,
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
(2012)).

Id. at *24.
Id. at *22–23.
Id. at 23.
Id. at *6.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011) (emphasis added).
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008).
See Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24.
See id.
Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1
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the court found that Congress included in CAFA detailed instructions on
jurisdiction and aggregation; thus, if Congress had intended for the
courts to aggregate between supposedly identical suits, it would have so
indicated.123 Applying Marple’s reasoning to Hubbard, which espoused
a bright-line rule for when a plaintiff can be the master of his complaint,
it is absurd to believe that Congress intended for the courts to create
such exceptions to plaintiffs crafting complaints.124
Congress wanted to expand federal jurisdiction by passing CAFA, but
Congress must be assumed to write legislation within the bounds it
intends to create.125 The Sixth Circuit need not defend Congress from
itself by, at best, filling in potential holes in the legislation, or, at worst,
expanding the legislation beyond its purpose. The colorable reason test
is the beginning of jurisprudence that could spur exceptions to the plain
reading of CAFA, and has led other courts to distinguish Freeman and
prevent the confusion of a statute easily discernible on its face.
The Marple court’s distaste for the Freeman colorable reason test is
apparent throughout its decision in both the statutory construction and in
statements like, “[t]he Sixth Circuit ignored the structure chosen by the
plaintiffs . . . .”126 The court distinguished Freeman because “there
[was] no indication that Marple artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid
the CAFA.”127 However, the court provides scant evidence of this, and
provides no guidance on whether the defense could prove such an
indication.128 This omission leaves open the possibility for more
defendants to use this argument in the future.
The court in Barria v. Dole Food Co. proceeded similarly to the court
in Marple and did not adopt Freeman, but at the same time refused to
discredit the decision.129 In Barria, the plaintiffs divided their suits so
each would have under 100 plaintiffs, and the defendants argued that
Freeman should prevent the plaintiffs from “gerrymander[ing] their
lawsuit to circumvent CAFA[]” and “artificially splinter[ing] their
actions to avoid jurisdictional thresholds.”130 The Ninth Circuit, like the
Eighth Circuit in Marple, looked to statutory interpretation and found
“[n]othing in CAFA suggests that plaintiffs, as masters of their
complaint, may not ‘file multiple actions, each with fewer than 100
plaintiffs, to work within the confines of CAFA to keep their state-law
123. Id.
124. Compare id., with Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *22–23.
125. See supra notes 89 and 102.
126. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See Barria v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
130. Id. at *12–13 (internal quotes omitted).
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claims in state court.’”131
The preceding reasoning is sound, as CAFA did not speak to anything
outside of claim aggregation within one class action.132 However, the
court failed to reject the Freeman decision explicitly and merely
distinguished the case on the facts.133 While true that the plaintiffs in
Freeman had divided their suits by time period, and the plaintiffs in
Barria divided their suits by “distinct plaintiffs,” neither the former nor
the latter are anywhere to be found in CAFA.134 Applying the Barria
court’s logic to the Freeman case, it would seem that the colorable
reason test should be isolated and refuted. However, no court has done
this, which will lead only to the problems that plagued class actions
before CAFA.
These types of decisions create uncertainty in the field of class
actions. The Freeman court created a malleable test that was turned into
an erroneous bright line rule by the federal district court in Hubbard.
Then, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits distinguished Freeman’s logic in
Marple and Barria, respectively, rather than rejecting the test. Such
rulings allow ill-defined tests to linger and propagate.
When drafting CAFA, Congress could have allowed defendants to
remove multiple class actions by aggregation upon a showing by a
preponderance of evidence that the statutory amount in controversy,
minimal diversity, and one-hundred plaintiffs requirements were met.
Congress did not do this, however, and the Freeman court essentially
added this provision to § 1332(d). On its own motion, the Freeman
court made multiple lawsuits one, and avoided the language of
Congress. Nonstatutory, poorly-defined tests lead laws away from their
original purpose or intent. Even worse, the practical effect of Freeman
was to allow the defendant to litigate what the dissent called a “matter of
local concern” in a federal court and deprive the plaintiffs of their
rights.135
In order to further the broad, fairness-based goals of CAFA, Congress
should act early to prevent the “colorable reason” test from creating
more uncertainty throughout the circuit courts.136 Varying standards of
proof and minor factual distinctions surrounding Freeman are creating a
confusing CAFA jurisprudence, and perhaps the most straightforward
131. Id. at *13 (citing Tanoh v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., No. CV 06-7038 PA (JTLx), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 102958, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008)).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011).
133. See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *14.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
135. See Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (Daughtrey,
J., dissenting).
136. The “colorable reason” test from Freeman has not yet been addressed by the 2nd, 4th, 5th,
10th, or 11th circuits, based on the “Shepardize” function from Lexis. See http://www.lexis.com.
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way Congress could eliminate the circuits’ discord over claim
aggregation is to prohibit the practice explicitly.
The court in Marple v. T-Mobile Central LLC analyzed the language
of CAFA closely and found “the absence of provisions for aggregating
between class actions here suggests . . . the singular is significant.”137
This reasoning is sensible, because CAFA is a detailed statute that was
debated at length in Congress.138 CAFA specifically offered guidance
for the aggregation of claims within a lawsuit,139 yet, as the Marple
court points out, CAFA did not speak to aggregation between class
actions.140 Without guidance on aggregating claims, a procedurally
challenging issue,141 courts should not design such malleable and poorly
defined tests as the colorable reason test.
An explicit statement following § 1332(d)(6) that outright prevented
the aggregation of claims inter-suit rather than intra-suit would carry out
not only what is most likely the intent of Congress, but also eliminate a
growing disparity in the federal courts.142 In addition, Congress could
clarify that the “plaintiff is the master of the complaint” by specifically
excluding the intent of plaintiffs and their counsel during the crafting of
their complaints from the eyes of judges and defendants in removal
motions.
As more defendants test the water throughout the country, the
colorable basis test is likely to stick in courts that are not plaintifffriendly. The test gives judges fodder to either grant or deny removal
without clear explanations,143 and it risks recreating and exacerbating
the problems of forum shopping and plaintiff-friendly courts if Congress
does not clarify the language of the statute. What may seem like a
minor problem now can be easily fixed, and if loose jurisprudence is
allowed to develop in such a complex field, both plaintiffs and
defendants will be at a disadvantage as the law becomes less clear.
The judicial decisions surrounding Freeman not only put in conflict
the language and intent of CAFA, but also the burdens of the plaintiffs
in filing a claim and the defendants in removing it.

137. Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110 (8th Cir. 2011).
138. See Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3–4, *7–
11 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008).
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011).
140. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1110.
141. See Hubbard vs. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2:09-CV-233 and No. 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859, at *12–24 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
142. Such an explicit statement in § 1332(d)(6) might read “In any single class action, the claims
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the claims of class members
in separate suits shall not be aggregated.” (emphasis added to potential amended language).
143. See, e.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008).
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B. Shifting Burdens of Proof and Forum Shopping
Freeman left unanswered what standard of proof CAFA requires for
defendants to remove when a plaintiff limits damages to less than the
minimal amount in controversy.144 The court used a unique trick by
first combining five suits into one with damages totaling $24.5 million.
Then, it applied the standard for remanding a case.145 Essentially, the
court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show to a “legal certainty”
the damages would not meet the amount in controversy, which was
presumed correct under the court-instituted removal.146 The court also
ignored the defendant’s logical argument that because there were 300
class members and the amount claimed by each member was $74,000,
the amount in controversy would exceed the damage cap of $4.9
million.147
By proceeding in the aforementioned manner, the Sixth Circuit
ignored the defendant’s reasonable argument which would have allowed
for removal of each suit without aggregation.148 Also, it surely caught
both parties off guard and left countless questions unanswered in future
litigation. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the “new section
1332(d) is intended to expand substantially federal court
jurisdiction . . . [i]ts provisions should be read broadly, with a strong
preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court
if properly removed by any defendant.”149 The court in Freeman did not
require the defendant to show any proof that the cases should be
removed.150 The defendant was fortunate, because even though the
court found its cursory argument about the claims of the individuals
overriding the class amount in controversy “not persuasive,”151 the
majority did not allow the plaintiffs to structure the suits and removed
the cases sua sponte.152
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. The total amount for 300 plaintiffs claiming $74,000 would be $22.2 million, but the
court found the $4.9 million dollar cap for each suit superseded the individual caps. See id.
148. All 300 plaintiffs were in each suit; the suits were merely divided by time. See id. at 406–07.
So the court could have said in each suit that if damages were capped at $74,000 per plaintiff, with 300
plaintiffs the damages could be as much as $22.2 million, and not the $4.9 million cap. This would
cause problems, however, because in the Sixth Circuit the court states, “Generally, if a plaintiff does not
desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the
jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant cannot remove.”
Id. at 409 (internal quotes omitted).
149. Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *8 (E.D. Tenn.
Sept. 23, 2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted).
150. Freeman 551 F.3d at 409.
151. Id.
152. Id. The aggregation issue was not raised by defendants. See id.
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In future cases similar to Freeman, the question will become what
standard or type of proof defendants must show to prove that
aggregation of claims is warranted. In Freeman, the plaintiffs’ lawyer
admitted at oral argument that avoiding CAFA was the only reason for
structuring the claims in such a way.153 This admission might show that
clear and convincing evidence is required for aggregating claims
between different suits. On the other hand, perhaps less straightforward
circumstantial evidence of attempting to avoid federal jurisdiction would
be sufficient if the defendants could show that the plaintiffs are
substantially similarly situated and there exists no colorable reason for
splitting their claims. Regardless, defendants in the Sixth Circuit, and
anywhere else the Freeman test may be adopted, are unaware as to how
to properly remove a case, yet still are not as disadvantaged as the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs’ case in Freeman was remanded to the district court,
where they would need to show to a “legal certainty” that their
aggregated claims would not exceed $5 million.154 However, this
became nearly impossible after the appellate court found, “plaintiffs’
suits in the aggregate seek up to $24.5 million.”155 Had the plaintiffs
been aware of a risk of aggregation, they likely would have sought
damages independently in state courts without a class action. And,
while the American justice system assumes that citizens know the
law,156 such knowledge becomes difficult when judges make
modifications to laws sua sponte based on congressional intent.
Litigants face difficulty from the colorable reason test because it is a
poorly defined strong hammer that judges can use to mold class actions.
Future plaintiffs should be sure to have a “colorable reason” when
forming their suits, especially in the Sixth Circuit, even though these are
not defined by case law or by statute. If plaintiffs want to be sure to
litigate their case in state court, they may need to be able to show “to a
legal certainty” that the damages do not exceed $5 million.157
In Proffitt v. Abbot Labs., the case from which Freeman derived its
reasoning, the court briefly described the burden of proof typically
placed on defendants in removal situations, explaining, “CAFA does not
alter the fact that the removing defendant has the burden of
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in

153. Id. at 407.
154. Id. at 409.
155. Id.
156. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“Based on the notion that the law is
definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law
rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes.”).
157. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 409.
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controversy requirement has been met.”158
This statement was
disingenuous, however, because while the court concluded that, “[t]he
defendant has made the necessary showing that the amount in
controversy has been met,” it never explained how the defendant did
so.159 The court discussed at length the policy behind CAFA and why
plaintiffs should not be able to split their suits simply by arbitrary time
periods, then ultimately determined the claims must be aggregated and
removed.160 In Proffitt, unlike Freeman, no direct evidence, or
otherwise, had been presented to show that the plaintiffs had in fact split
their suits to avoid federal jurisdiction.161 Perhaps, in order to avoid
Proffitt’s mere facial statement that the defendant “made the necessary
showing,” this is why the Freeman court ignored the question as to the
level of proof needed to remove when there is a factual dispute as to
damages.
Regardless, in both Freeman and Proffitt, the courts find cover for
their sua sponte decisions. The Proffitt court concluded that the
defendant had “made the necessary showing” for removal without
explanation,162 and the Freeman court required no showing because the
five suits were actually only one suit.163 Again, these decisions take a
great weight off the shoulders of removing defendants, while
introducing uncertainty into plaintiffs’ litigation.
In the more recent Sixth Circuit case, Hubbard v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., the court discussed standards of proof surrounding removal
jurisdiction in the Sixth Circuit and found that the “legal certainty” test
applied in cases where an amount was specified over the amount in
controversy, and the defendant seeks to prove less.164 The court also
found that a preponderance standard applied in cases of unspecified
amounts, where a defendant need only show that it is more likely than
not the amount exceed the minimum amount in controversy.165 The
court held that because the Freeman court treated the aggregated claims
as one “specified amount,” the legal certainty test must apply if the suits
158. Proffitt v. Abbot Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
Sept., 23, 2008) (citing Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2007)).
The preponderance standard is also referred to by many courts as the “more likely than not” standard,
i.e. if a defendant can show that it is more likely than not that the damages will exceed the minimum
amount in controversy, then the case can be removed. See id. at *5.
159. Id. at *13.
160. Id. at *3–13.
161. See id. Remember in Freeman that the plaintiffs’ counsel was on record saying that avoiding
CAFA was the only reason for splintering the suits. See Freeman 551 F.3d at 407 (6th Cir. 2008).
162. Proffitt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *13.
163. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 406–11.
164. Hubbard vs. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859, at *17–21 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
165. Id.
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are aggregated.166 Thus, once the Hubbard court aggregated the suits, it
stated, “the amounts in controversy are aggregated to total nearly
$10,000,000. As such, this Court applies the legal certainty test, and
further FINDS that the test has been met.”167
Again, the court’s decision gave no indication as to how the
defendants carried any burden in Hubbard, and the plaintiffs had no
chance to rebut the court’s near-immediate assumption that the amount
in controversy met the legal certainty test.168 Because the Freeman test
does not include any process, the defendants and plaintiffs in these cases
do not make motions or show proof. The courts, in the Sixth circuit at
least, bypass these steps and remove cases sua sponte.
The problems with Freeman, Proffitt, and Hubbard are legion
because courts use incomprehensible standards of proof to grant
removal jurisdiction to defendants. In Freeman, the court “need[ed] not
decide the proper standard of proof under CAFA”;169 in Proffitt, the
defendant “demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy requirement has been met”;170 and in Hubbard,
“the legal certainty test . . . ha[d] been met.”171 What would cause such
variation and confusion in substantially similar cases where all the
courts are doing is aggregating claims that have no “colorable reason” to
be splintered? The confusion arises because no law exists that allows
courts to aggregate claims on their own initiative, and it is being
developed as the courts act sua sponte. After these three cases, both
plaintiffs and defendants are in worse positions because neither party
knows what burden it may or may not face in removing or remanding
cases. Further, the preceding cases discuss only the Sixth Circuit’s
approach; other circuits have even more varying standards of proof
required for removal.
The Eight Circuit in Marple v. T-Mobile Central, LLC never reached
the question of standard of proof, because it disagreed with the principle
of inter-suit claim aggregation.172 However, as “colorable reasons” go,
the question in Marple v. T-Mobile, LLC becomes: what exactly did the
court find “colorable” about the plaintiffs’ reasons? The Marple court
admitted that the plaintiffs structuring was similar to that in Freeman,
but distinguished the case and stated, “[i]n contrast, the structure of

166. Id. at *19.
167. Id. at *24.
168. See id. at *24 (emphasis in original).
169. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008).
170. Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3, *13 (E.D.
Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008).
171. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24.
172. See Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011).
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Marple’s class actions exactly mirror the underlying ten lawsuits
brought by T-Mobile . . . . Moreover, there is no indication that Marple
artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid the CAFA.”173 The court did not
adopt the test from Freeman; however, it subtly gave the colorable
reason test credence by looking for reasons why the plaintiffs split their
case.
As noted throughout this paper, CAFA has no explicit
requirement that plaintiffs offer any reason for disclaiming damages
over $5 million and splitting claims. Yet, the court found it necessary to
specify that “there is no indication that Marple artificially divided the
lawsuit to avoid the CAFA.”174 This statement could signify that if
there had been evidence in this case of “artificial” claim splitting, the
court would have acknowledged the argument. The court did not
explain how evidence of “artificially” splitting conflicts with what the
court seems to be calling “colorable basis,” here mirroring T-Mobile’s
prior litigation.175
Similarly, in Barria v. Dole Food Co. the Ninth Circuit addressed its
own legal standard for removal to federal court.176 The court began by
explaining that the Ninth Circuit “strictly construes the removal statutes
against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if there is
any doubt as to the right of removal.”177 The court further noted the
heavy burden the defendant has to meet in order to achieve removal,
including the proper procedural requirements.178
Regarding the claims in Barria, the defendants merely reviewed the
plaintiffs’ complaints and attempted to show that removal jurisdiction
under CAFA was appropriate.179 The defendants argued in part that
because 2,485 plaintiffs filed the action in a state court where the
minimum jurisdictional limit was $25,000, the amount in controversy
would exceed $62 million.180 However, this reasoning did not persuade
the court, and it explained that the defendants did not overcome the
“strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.”181 The plaintiffs
divided their claims “alphabetically and by country,”182 in contrast with

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *5–
12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
177. Id. at *6 (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at *7–9.
180. Id. at *9.
181. Id. at *9, *11 (internal quotes omitted). Further, the court would not agree to allow the
defendants to serve requests for admission to the plaintiffs asking if they admit or deny that they were
seeking at least $75,000 in the lawsuit. Id. at *9, *11–12.
182. Id. at *4.
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Hubbard, where dividing suits between distinct plaintiffs, current and
former NCAA student athletes, was not a “colorable reason.”183 In
Hubbard, the court found that plaintiffs representing current and former
student athletes too closely resembled division by arbitrary time
periods.184 Expanding this logic, then, it is not difficult to see how
another court more willing than the Barria court to apply the Freeman
test could say that dividing plaintiffs alphabetically and by country is
simply a way of dividing the suits by arbitrary time periods over which
damages occurred in the different countries.
The Barria defendants made a facially logical argument in support of
removal jurisdiction, similar to the argument in Freeman v. Blue Ridge
Paper Products, Inc.185 However, it could not overcome the Ninth
Circuit’s strong presumption against removal.186 The court followed the
language of CAFA closely, and did not allow removal where defendants
could not show the amount in controversy was met literally.187 At the
same time, the Ninth Circuit placed a burden on defendants that
defendants in the Sixth Circuit are less likely to face in the wake of
Freeman. Does this mean that the Sixth Circuit has gone rogue in its
interpretation of CAFA?
Hardly.
The Ninth Circuit, too, is
manipulating CAFA. CAFA does not state that matters of removal
should have a “strong presumption” against the defendants.188 While
this might be the Ninth Circuit’s law generally, it conflicts with both the
intent of CAFA and the Sixth Circuit’s overly expansive reading of
removal jurisdiction. The problems flowing from these decisions are the
same problems that CAFA was intended to fix.
Federal consistency in removal jurisprudence is essential if CAFA is
to achieve its goals of avoiding forum shopping by plaintiffs and
preventing plaintiffs from “gaming the system.” However, what better
would let plaintiffs game the system than knowing in the Sixth Circuit
they might face claim aggregation, but in the Ninth Circuit there is a
strong presumption against removal? In addition to denying courts the
ability to aggregate claims statutorily in order to provide some certainty
to litigants, Congress could craft a compulsory joinder device similar to

183. See Hubbard v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77859, at *24 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). The defendants were also different in Hubbard. See id. at
*23–24.
184. Id.
185. Barria 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *8–12. See also Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper
Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We do not rely, however, on Blue Ridge’s argument
that the jurisdictional amount is exceeded in each one of the separate cases by virtue of the number of
class members (300) and the amount that each class member claimed ($74,000)”).
186. See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *9.
187. Id.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).
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Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.189 In order to protect
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, such a practical rule would
dispose of issues through a limited number of proceedings, rather than
through duplicative litigation. A possible reading of such a clause could
incorporate language from Federal Rule 23(b)(3) which governs many
large consumer class actions.190 Below in italics are proposed modified
portions of Rule 23(b)(3) which would provide a suitable test for
aggregation between suits:
Aggregation of class suits may be appropriate if: the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class action claims predominate over
any questions affecting only individual classes, and that a single class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings
include:
(A) the classes’ interests in controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against separate classes;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
191
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a single class action.

With light modification, a common rule and widely used class
certification test factors can be applied to not only aggregating
individual claims into a class action, but multiple class actions into a
single class action. Such a clause would further the intent of CAFA in
that it would provide judges with the ability to aggregate class suits into
entities that are more easily removable to federal court, which is what
the Freeman court stretched the law beyond recognition to do.
More importantly, with such a rule, the circuits would develop similar
jurisprudence, and plaintiffs and defendants would be put on notice as to
what their burdens of proof were to either receive or defeat joinder of
suits. Such a system would be vastly superior to that begun by Freeman
where judges, clearly fed up with plaintiffs trying to avoid federal
jurisdiction, have begun to remove suits sua sponte, without good
reasoning or consistency.
Other statutory alternatives surely exist, but the aforementioned
statutory additions are two ways to avoid the awkward feeling when a
plaintiff class files a $4,999,999 suit, and the judge has no recourse
other than to design a law not present in CAFA in order to send the class
to the federal courts.
189. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
190. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since Congress passed CAFA in 2005, plaintiffs’ attorneys have
found unique ways to avoid litigating in the federal courts, which are
typically less friendly to plaintiffs than many of the state courts before
CAFA. However, rather than amend CAFA in order to fix some of the
legislation’s holes, Congress has not acted, leaving the courts on their
own and understandably frustrated. This frustration led the Sixth Circuit
in Freeman v Blue Ridge Paper Products., Inc. to go beyond the letter of
the law and aggregate suits in order to satisfy federal jurisdictional
requirements. Other circuits have not followed in Freeman’s wake;
however, courts not adopting Freeman have looked to its fast and loose
reasoning in order to distinguish cases on minor factual differences and
a variety of congressional records. Many courts have been forced to
make the types of decisions that could be said to be “distinctions without
differences,” resulting in confusion regarding when class action claims
can be separated and when they cannot. The best way to avoid any
further expansion of the aggregation principle in the circuit courts
surrounding the Freeman test is by either explicitly eliminating intersuit claim aggregation or allowing for a defined joinder mechanism in
the federal courts that allows plaintiffs and defendants to be put on
notice as to when their suits may be aggregated.
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